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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1. On November 16, 1995 the trial court signed the contempt 
order against Appellant. (R. 728). 
2. Respective counsel for both parties agreed that this 
order required Appellant to pay all reasonable and necessarily 
incurred attorney fees and costs that Appellee had incurred in 
connection with the show cause hearings to date. (See Exhibit 
One of Appellee's Brief). 
3. The Appellant filed an objection, pro se, on November 
16, 1995, to the order concerning attorney fees and other issues. 
(R. 730). 
4. The trial court determined that this objection was 
timely filed and vacated the November 16 order to consider the 
objection. (R. 734). 
5. The court then ordered that respective counsel for both 
sides meet to generate an amended proposed order reflecting any 
agreed upon changes which would be submitted to the court on or 
before December 8, 1995. (R. 734). 
6. In addition, the court ordered that if any objections 
remain unresolved, then an amended objection shall likewise be 
filed by plaintiff on or before December 8, 1995. (R. 734). 
7. Respective counsel failed to meet, however they did have 
a discussion over the phone concerning the time period for which 
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the reasonable fees would be assessed. (See Exhibit One of 
Appellee's Brief). 
8. Appellee's counsel, Mr. Mangrum, then drafted a vague 
letter concerning this phone call without mentioning the 
reasonableness of the fees anywhere in the letter, only the time 
period for which the fees would be assessed. (Id.). 
9. On December 8, 1995, pursuant to the court's order 
concerning any remaining objections, Appellant filed an 
objection, pro se, to the reasonableness of the attorney fees 
sought as claimed in Mr. Mangrum's affidavit. (R. 738-757). 
10. The court determined that Appellant was precluded from 
contesting the reasonableness of attorney fees as stated in Mr. 
Mangrum's affidavit because of the vague letter signed by both 
counsel concerning the dates to be considered and because 
Appellant did not obtain leave from the court to appear pro se on 
December 8, 1995. (Tr. 972). 
11. For these reasons, the court refused to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of the reasonableness of 
attorney fees. (R. 820; Tr. 960). 
12. The final order was entered on January 6, 1997, and 
Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal on January 17, 1997. (R. 
847-49). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Timely Objections Were Made by the Appellant and 
Therefore the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Not 
Holding an Evidentiary Hearing on the Reasonableness of 
Attorney Fees. 
A. Appellant's Pro Se Objections Were Valid and 
Timely. 
Appellant's objection made on November 16, 1995 and her 
amended objection made on December 8, 1995 were valid and timely. 
The Utah Constitution states that uno person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party." 
Utah Const, art. If §11 (emphasis added). Appellant had counsel, 
Mr. Ward, on both of these dates, however, Mr. Ward was 
unavailable to file timely objections on these dates. (R. 821-
22). Therefore, the trial court erred by dismissing her amended 
objection on the grounds that she had not received leave from the 
court to file pro se because in so doing, the trial court was 
denying Appellant's right to prosecute or defend a civil cause to 
which she was a party as stated in the Utah Constitution. In 
addition, Appellant's pro se objection made on November 16 was 
accepted by the court as valid and timely without any mention 
from the court about leave being required to file pro se. (R. 
734) . 
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Appellant's pro se objections were both made timely. The 
objection on November 16 was accepted by the court as timely, and 
the court subsequently vacated the November 16 order to consider 
the objection. (R. 734). The order pertained to the contempt 
charge and the payment by Appellant of reasonable attorney fees 
to Appellee. (R. 847). The objection was not artfully crafted, 
however, it did present objections to the attorney fees. (R. 
730). The Supreme Court has held that pro se civil complaints 
are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 
drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) 
(per curiam). Further, the Court stated that if the pro se 
allegations are sufficient, "however inartfully pleaded, . . . 
[then they] call for the opportunity to offer supporting 
evidence." Id. 
The trial court allowed that amended objections could be 
filed on or before December 8, 1995. (R. 734). Appellant filed 
her amended objection on December 8. (R. 738-57). After 
reviewing Appellant's objection and amended objection, however 
unartfully pleaded, it is apparent that Appellant has 
sufficiently alleged that the attorney fees requested are 
unreasonable. Therefore, an opportunity to offer supporting 
evidence is required. 
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B. The Letter Dated December 6, 1995 Did Not Contemplate 
the Reasonableness of the Attorney Fees and Therefore 
There Was No Stipulation as to the Reasonableness 
Issue. 
Pursuant to the court's order, counsel for both parties 
discussed the time frame for which reasonable attorney fees would 
be assessed. Counsel discussed this over the phone, and 
Appellee's counsel drafted a letter, dated December 6, 1995, (the 
"Letter") concerning this discussion. (R. 821-23). First, the 
Letter reiterated the court order that Appellant be required to 
pay all reasonable and necessarily incurred attorney fees and 
costs that Appellee had incurred in connection with the show 
cause hearings to date. (R. 821-23). Second, the Letter 
described how each counsel interpreted this order in relation to 
the multiple contempt motions filed by Appellee and the time 
frame for which the court required reasonable attorney fees to be 
assessed. (R. 821-23). 
Nowhere in the Letter did either party stipulate to what 
would constitute reasonable attorney fees. (R. 821-23). The 
parties were merely discussing the relevant time frames. (R. 
821-23). This is apparent from a number of facts. 
First, Appellant's original objection, timely filed on 
November 16, 1995, to the reasonableness of attorney fees was not 
waived anywhere in the language of the Letter. (R. 821-23). In 
order for a waiver to be found "it must be made to appear that 
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[Appellant] waived the right either in express terms or by 
showing such facts and circumstances from which the intention to 
waive may be clearly inferred or implied." Woolley v. Loose, 194 
P. 908, 912 (Utah 1920). There was no express waiver in the 
Letter (R. 821-23), nor do the facts and circumstances show an 
intention to waive Appellant's objection. (See below). 
Second, Appellant did not intend to waive her objection to 
the reasonableness of the fees requested as evidenced by her 
second pro se objection on December 8, 1995, (R. 738-757), and 
therefore, the trial court erred by considering the Letter to be 
a waiver. "A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right." Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 61 P.2d 308, 311 (Utah 
1936)(emphasis added). The Minute Entry on November 17, 1995, 
which ordered both counsel to meet, also required that if any 
objections remained unresolved, then an amended objection had to 
be filed on or before December 8, 1995. (R. 734.). Appellant's 
amended objection was timely filed and enumerated her objections 
to the reasonableness of the requested fees. (R. 734). Since 
the Letter does not contain an express waiver of her objection to 
the reasonableness of the fees requested, and the facts do not 
reveal any implied waiver or intention to waive, the trial court 
erred in finding that Appellant waived her objection. 
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In addition, it is evident from Mr. Mangrum's subsequent 
filings that he also believed that the reasonableness of the fees 
requested was an unresolved issue after the Letter. Mr. Mangrum, 
in responding to a motion by Appellant, argued that "the only 
unresolved issue [sic] is the reasonableness of fees incurred." 
(R. 793). In addition, in an affidavit filed July 10, 1996, Mr. 
Mangrum asserted that "the only unresolved issue is the 
reasonabl eness of the fees for the time expended." (R. 795—804 
and 114 at 797) . 
Finally, the Letter refers to the court order requiring 
Appellant to pay reasonable attorney fees, and then goes on to 
state the interpretations of counsel concerning the time frames 
for these fees. (R. 821-23). The Letter does not discuss the 
reasonableness of the fees requested or that this issue was even 
brought up during counsels' telephone conference. (R. 821-23). 
According to Mr. Ward's affidavit, the telephone conference 
discussion was limited to the amount of $2,200 which was 
proffered by Mr. Mangrum at the time of trial. (See Exhibit One 
of Appellee's Brief). 
Therefore, without express language to the contrary in the 
Letter, the trial court interpreted the Letter to be a waiver of 
Appellant's objection to the reasonableness of the attorney fees, 
and a decision by both counsel to ignore the court' s order that 
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Appellant only had to pay the reasonable attorney fees. 
The record shows that the Letter was not a stipulation by 
Appellant waiving her objection to the reasonableness of the 
attorney fees requested by Appellee. 
C. Because the Parties Did Not Agree Otherwise, the Trial 
Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Taking Evidence of 
the Reasonableness of the Attorney Fees. 
As evidenced from the arguments above, the parties did not 
stipulate to the reasonableness of the attorney fees, and 
therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
consider the evidence concerning the reasonableness of the fees 
awarded. "The Utah Supreme Court stated that unless the parties 
agree otherwise, a trial court must take evidence of the 
reasonableness of attorney fees and make findings thereon." 
Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 679 (Utah App. 
1994)(emphasis added) (citing Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 497 
P.2d 629, 630 (Utah 1972). Therefore, the trial court abused its 
discretion by not considering evidence on the reasonableness of 
attorney fees. 
II. Appellee Attorney's Affidavit Concerning Attorney 
Fees Was Insufficient Under Utah Law. 
The mere listing of general activities and an hourly rate 
accompanied by a simple statement that the fees are reasonable in 
an affidavit is insufficient proof for an award of reasonable 
attorney fees. Rule 4-505 of the Code of Judicial Administration 
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requires affidavits in support of attorney fees: 
[M]ust be filed with the court and set forth 
specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature 
of the work performed by the attorney, the number of 
hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the 
time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for 
which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the 
reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal 
services. (emphasis added). 
The self-serving statement that the fees are reasonable does not 
"affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal 
services" as required by Utah law. (R. 755-56). In addition, 
this affidavit was timely objected to by Appellant so there 
should have been an evidentiary hearing on the issue. (See 
Arguments I, A-C above). 
To determine a reasonable amount for attorney fees the trial 
court should have considered: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary 
to adequately prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney1 s billing rate consistent with the 
rates customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of 
additional factors, including those listed in the Code 
of Professional Responsibility? 
American Vending Services. Inc. v. Morse. 881 P.2d 917, 926 (Utah 
App. 1994)(citing Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 990, 
(Utah 1988)(footnotes omitted). The trial court failed to 
support its order for attorney fees with evidence in the record 
and failed "to show that it had undergone an analysis similar to 
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that contemplated by Dixie State Bank." Id, "The failure of the 
trial court to enter adequate findings requires that the judgment 
be vacated." Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of County Comm' rs, 589 
P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979). Therefore, Mr. Mangrum' s affidavit was 
insufficient, under Utah law, for an award of attorney's fees and 
the trial court erred by awarding those fees without an 
evidentiary hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, as well as those stated in 
Appellant's Appellate Brief, the decision of the trial court 
should be reversed and the matter remanded for a determination of 
the amount of fees which should be awarded to Mrs. Kramer on 
appeal. Alternatively, this matter should be remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing, for entry of detailed findings of fact after 
an independent and full inquiry by the trial court, and for an 
appropriate revision of the judgment. 
DATED this &_ day of July, 1997. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
M. JO? 
Attorney for the Appellant 
// 
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